Dot Physical Form For Ups Drivers

 
  1. Dot Physical Form For Ups Drivers

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Start Preamble Start Printed Page 3854 AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). SUMMARY: This document proposes to establish a new Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS), No. 150, to mandate vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications for new light vehicles and to standardize the message and format of V2V transmissions. This will create an information environment in which vehicle and device manufacturers can create and implement applications to improve safety, mobility, and the environment. Without a mandate to require and standardize V2V communications, the agency believes that manufacturers will not be able to move forward in an efficient way and that a critical mass of equipped vehicles would take many years to develop, if ever.

Implementation of the new standard will enable vehicle manufacturers to develop safety applications that employ V2V communications as an input, two of which are estimated to prevent hundreds of thousands of crashes and prevent over one thousand fatalities annually. DATES: Comments must be received on or before April 12, 2017. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments to the docket number identified in the heading of this document by any of the following methods:. Online: Go to and follow the online instructions for submitting comments.

Mail: Docket Management Facility, M-30, U.S. Department of Transportation, West Building, Ground Floor, Rm. W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. Hand Delivery or Courier: West Building, Ground Floor, Rm. W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., between 9 a.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays. Fax: (202) 493-2251.

Regardless of how you submit your comments, you should mention the docket number of this document. You may call the Docket Management Facility at 202-366-9826. Instructions: Direct your comments to Docket No. See the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section on “Public Participation” for more information about submitting written comments. Docket: All documents in the dockets are listed in the index. Although listed in the index, some information is not publicly available, e.g., confidential business information (CBI) or other information whose disclosure is restricted by statute.

Publicly available docket materials are available either electronically in regulations.gov or in hard copy at DOT's Docket Management Facility, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., West Building, Ground Floor, Rm. W12-140, Washington, DC 20590. The Docket Management Facility is open between 9 a.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays. Start Further Info FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues, Mr.

Gregory Powell, Office of Rulemaking, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone: (202) 366-5206; Fax: (202) 493-2990; email:. For legal issues, Ms. Rebecca Yoon, Office of the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone: (202) 366-2992; email:.

End Further Info End Preamble Start Supplemental Information SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Table of Contents I. Executive Summary II. Background A.

The Safety Need 1. Overall Crash Population That V2V Could Help Address 2. Pre-Crash Scenarios Potentially Addressed by V2V Communications B. Ways To Address the Safety Need 1. Radar and Camera Based Systems 2. Communication-Based Systems 3.

Fusion of Vehicle-Resident and Communication-Based Systems 4. Automated Systems C. V2V Research Up Until This Point 1. General Discussion 2. Main Topic Areas in Readiness Report 3. Research Conducted Between the Readiness Report and This Proposal D.

V2V International and Harmonization Efforts E. Summary of the ANPRM 2. Comments to the ANPRM F. SCMS RFI III. Proposal To Regulate V2V Communications A.

V2V Communications Proposal Overview B. Proposed V2V Mandate for New Light Vehicles, and Performance Requirements for Aftermarket for Existing Vehicles C. V2V Communication Devices That Would Be Subject to FMVSS No. Original Equipment (OE) Devices on New Motor Vehicles 2. Aftermarket Devices D. Potential Future Actions 1.

Potential Future Safety Application Mandate 2. Continued Technology Monitoring E. Performance Criteria for Wireless V2V Communication 1. Proposed Transmission Requirements 2.

Proposed V2V Basic Safety Message (BSM) Content 3. Message Signing and Authentication 4. Misbehavior Reporting 5. Proposed Malfunction Indication Requirements 6.

Software and Security Certificate Updates 7. Cybersecurity IV.

Public Acceptance, Privacy and Security A. Importance of Public Acceptance To Establishing the V2V System B. Elements That Can Affect Public Acceptance in the V2V Context 1. False Positives 2. Hacking (Cybersecurity) 4.

Research Conducted on Consumer Acceptance Issues 6. User Flexibilities for Participation in System C.

Consumer Privacy 1. NHTSA's PIA 2.

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Dot Physical Form For Ups Drivers

Privacy by Design and Data Privacy Protections 3. Data Access, Data Use and Privacy 4. V2V Privacy Statement 5. Consumer Education 6.

Congressional/Other Government Action D. Summary of PIA 1.

What is a PIA? Non-V2V Methods of Tracking 4.

V2V Data Flows/Transactions With Privacy Relevance 5. Privacy-Mitigating Controls 6. Potential Privacy Issues by Transaction Type E. Health Effects 1. Wireless Devices and Health and Safety Concerns 3.

Exposure Limits 4. Department of Energy (DOE) Smart Grid Implementation 5. Federal Agency Oversight & Responsibilities 6. EHS in the U.S.

And Abroad 7. Conclusion V. Device Authorization A.

Approaches to Security Credentialing B. Federated Security Credential Management (SCMS) 1. Technical Design 3. Independent Evaluation of SCMS Technical Design 4. SCMS RFI Comments and Agency Responses Start Printed Page 3855 5. SCMS ANPRM Comments and Agency Response 6.

SCMS Industry Governance C. Vehicle Based Security System (VBSS) D. Multiple Root Authority Credential Management VI.

What is the agency's legal authority to regulate V2V devices, and how is this proposal consistent with that authority? What can NHTSA regulate under the Vehicle Safety Act? What does the Vehicle Safety Act allow and require of NHTSA in issuing a new FMVSS, and how is the proposal consistent with those requirements? “Performance-Oriented” 2. Standards “Meeting the Need for Motor Vehicle Safety” 3. “Objective” Standards 4.

“Practicable” Standards C. How are the regulatory alternatives consistent with our Safety Act authority? What else needs to happen in order for a V2V system to be successful? Liability VII. Estimated Costs and Benefits A. General Approach to Costs and Benefits Estimates B.

Quantified Costs 1. Component Costs 2. Communication Costs 3.

Fuel Economy Impact 4. Overall Annual Costs 5.

Overall Model Year (MY) Costs C. Non-Quantified Costs 1. Health Insurance Costs Relating to EHS 2. Perceived Privacy Loss 3. Opportunity Costs of Spectrum for Other Uses 4.

Increased Litigation Costs D. Estimated Benefits 1. Assumptions and Overview 2.

Injury and Property Damage Benefits 3. Monetized Benefits 4. Non-Quantified Benefits E. Breakeven Analysis F. Cost Effectiveness and Positive Net Benefits Analysis 1. Cost Effectiveness 2. Lifetime Net Benefits for a Specified Model Year 3.

Uncertainty Analysis H. Estimated Costs and Benefits of V2V Alternatives VIII. Proposed Implementation Timing A. New Vehicles 1. Phase-In Period B. Aftermarket IX.

Public Participation A. How do I prepare and submit comments? Tips for Preparing Your Comments C. How can I be sure that my comments were received? How do I submit confidential business information? Will NHTSA consider late comments?

How can I read the comments submitted by other people? Regulatory Notices and Analyses A. Executive Order 12866, and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures B. Regulatory Flexibility Act C. (Federalism) D. (Civil Justice Reform) E.

Protection of Children From Environmental Health and Safety Risks F. Paperwork Reduction Act G. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act I. National Environmental Policy Act J.

Plain Language K. Regulatory Identifier Number (RIN) L. Privacy Act Proposed Regulatory Text I.

Executive Summary The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is proposing to issue a new Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 150, to require all new light vehicles to be capable of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (“V2V”) communications, such that they will send and receive Basic Safety Messages to and from other vehicles.

The proposal contains V2V communication performance requirements predicated on the use of on-board dedicated short-range radio communication (DSRC) devices to transmit Basic Safety Messages (BSM) about a vehicle's speed, heading, brake status, and other vehicle information to surrounding vehicles, and receive the same information from them. When received in a timely manner, this information would help vehicle systems identify potential crash situations with other vehicles and warn their drivers. The proposal also provides a path for vehicles to comply by deploying other technologies that meet certain performance and interoperability requirements, including interoperability with DSRC.

The agency believes that V2V has the potential to revolutionize motor vehicle safety. By providing drivers with timely warnings of impending crash situations, V2V-based safety applications could potentially reduce the number and severity of motor vehicle crashes, thereby reducing the losses and costs to society that would have resulted from these crashes. More specifically, the agency believes that V2V will be able to address crashes that cannot be prevented by current in-vehicle camera and sensor-based technologies (“vehicle-resident” technologies). This is because V2V would employ omnidirectional radio signals that provide 360 degree coverage along with offering the ability to “see” around corners and “see” through other vehicles. V2V is not restricted by the same line-of-sight limitations as crash avoidance technologies that rely on vehicle-resident sensors.

Additionally, V2V communications (BSMs) contain additional information, such as path predictions and driver actions (braking, steering) not available from traditional sensors. This information can be used by receiving vehicles to more reliably predict potential collision events as well as reduce false warnings. This ability to communicate certain information that cannot be acquired by vehicle-resident onboard sensors makes V2V particularly good at preventing impending intersection crashes, such as when a vehicle is attempting to make a left turn from one road to another. V2V also offers an operational range of 300 meters or farther between vehicles, nearly double the detection distance afforded by some current and near-term vehicle-resident systems.

These unique characteristics allow V2V-equipped vehicles to perceive and warn drivers of some threats sooner than vehicle-resident sensors can. Furthermore, while the operational status or accuracy of vehicle-resident sensors may be affected by weather, sunlight, shadows, or cleanliness, V2V technology does not share these same system limitations.

As another source of information about the driving environment, moreover, the agency also believes that V2V can be fused with existing radar- and camera-based systems to provide even greater crash avoidance capability than either approach alone. For vehicles equipped with current on-board sensors, the fundamentally different, but complementary, information stream provided by V2V has the potential to significantly enhance the reliability and accuracy of the sensor-based information available. Instead of relying on each vehicle to sense its surroundings on its own, V2V enables surrounding vehicles to help each other by conveying safety information about themselves to other vehicles. V2V communication can thus detect threat vehicles that are not in the sensors' field of view, and can use V2V information to validate a return signal from a vehicle-based sensor.

Further, V2V can provide information on the operational status ( e.g., brake pedal status, transmission state, stability control status, vehicle at rest versus moving, etc.) of other V2V-equipped vehicles. Similarly, vehicle-resident systems can augment V2V systems by providing the information necessary to address other crash scenarios not covered by V2V communications, such as lane and road departure. These added capabilities can potentially lead to more timely warnings and a reduction in the number of false warnings, thereby adding confidence to the overall safety system, and increasing consumer satisfaction Start Printed Page 3856and acceptance. Although some have contended that vehicle-resident systems could evolve to the point where they have similar ranges to V2V transmissions during the time it will take V2V to penetrate the fleet, the agency believes that these technologies will remain complementary rather than competing even as vehicle-resident systems continue to improve. In the longer-term, the agency believes that this fusion of V2V and vehicle-resident technologies will advance the further development of vehicle automation systems, including the potential for truly self-driving vehicles.

Although most existing automated systems currently rely on data obtained from vehicle-resident technologies, we believe that data acquired from GPS and telecommunications like V2V could significantly augment such systems. Communication-based technology that connects vehicles with each other could not only improve the performance of automated onboard crash warning systems, but also be a developmental stage toward achieving widespread deployment of safe and reliable automated vehicles. Despite these potential benefits, V2V offers challenges that are not present in vehicle-resident systems. Without government action, these challenges could prevent this promising safety technology from achieving sufficiently widespread use throughout the vehicle fleet to achieve these benefits. Most prominently, vehicles need to communicate a standard set of information to each other, using interoperable communications that all vehicles can understand. The ability of vehicles to both transmit and receive V2V communications from all other vehicles equipped with a V2V communications technology is referred to in this document as “interoperability,” and it is vital to V2V's success. Without interoperability, manufacturers attempting to implement V2V will find that their vehicles are not necessarily able to communicate with other manufacturers' vehicles and equipment, defeating the objective of the mandate and stifling the potential for innovation that the new information environment can create.

In addition, there is the issue of achieving critical mass: That V2V can only begin to provide significant safety benefits when a significant fraction of vehicles comprising the fleet can transmit and receive the same information in an interoperable fashion. The improvement in safety that results from enabling vehicles to communicate with one another depends directly on the fraction of the vehicle fleet that is equipped with the necessary technology, and on its ability to perform reliably. In turn, the effectiveness of any V2V communications technology depends on its ability to reliably transmit and receive recognizable and verifiable standardized information. Because the value to potential buyers of purchasing a vehicle that is equipped with V2V communications technology depends upon how many other vehicle owners have also purchased comparably-equipped models, V2V communications has many of the same characteristics as more familiar network communications technologies.

Viewed another way, an important consequence of any improvement in fleet-wide vehicle safety that results from an individual buyer's decision to purchase a V2V-capable model is the resulting increase in the safety of occupants of other V2V-equipped vehicles. Thus the society-wide benefits of individual vehicle buyers' decisions to purchase V2V-capable models extend well beyond the direct increase in their own safety; in economic parlance, their decisions can confer external benefits on other travelers. Thus a significant “network externality” arises from a new vehicle buyer's decision to purchase a vehicle equipped to connect to the existing V2V communications network. Conversely, however, the benefits that any individual consumer would receive from voluntary adoption of V2V depend directly on the voluntary adoption of this technology by other consumers. Unless individual buyers believe that a significant number of other buyers will obtain V2V systems, they may conclude that the potential benefits they would receive from this system are unlikely to materialize. As a consequence, they are less likely to invest in V2V communications capabilities that would be would be justified by the resulting improvement in fleet-wide safety. The proposed requirement that all new vehicles be V2V-capable is thus likely to improve transportation safety more rapidly, effectively, and ultimately more extensively than would result from relying on the private decisions of individual vehicle buyers.

Another important consideration in achieving safety benefits from V2V is the long product lifespan of motor vehicles and the resulting slow fleet turnover. This places inherent constraints on the rate at which diffusion of new technologies throughout the entire vehicle fleet can occur. Thus in order to reach the critical mass of participants, a significant portion of the existing vehicle fleet will need replacement and a sustained, coordinated commitment on the part of manufacturers. Due to the inherent characteristics of the automobile market, manufacturers will inevitably face changing economic conditions and perhaps imperfect signals from vehicle buyers and owners, and these signals may not be based on complete information about the effectiveness of V2V technology, or incorporate the necessary foresight to value the potential life-saving benefits of V2V technology during the crucial phase of its diffusion. Without government intervention, the resulting uncertainty could undermine manufacturer plans or weaken manufacturers' incentive to develop V2V technology to its full potential. We are, therefore, confident that creating the information environment through this mandate would lead to considerable advances in safety, and that those advances might not reach fruition if V2V communications were left to develop on their own. Overview of the Proposed Rule The agency believes the market will not achieve sufficient coverage absent a mandate V2V capability for all new light vehicles.

A V2V system as currently envisioned would be a combination of many elements. This includes a radio technology for the transmission and reception of messages, the structure and contents of “basic safety messages” (BSMs), the authentication of incoming messages by receivers, and, depending on a vehicle's behavior, the triggering of one or more safety warnings to drivers. The agency is also proposing to require that vehicles be capable of receiving over-the-air (OTA) security and software updates (and to seek consumer consent for such updates where appropriate). In addition, NHTSA is also proposing that vehicles contain “firewalls” between V2V modules and other vehicle modules connected to the data bus to help isolate V2V modules Start Printed Page 3857being used as a potential conduit into other vehicle systems. The NPRM presents a comprehensive proposal for mandating DSRC-based V2V communications. That proposal includes a pathway for vehicles to comply using non-DSRC technologies that meet certain performance and interoperability standards. A key component of interoperability is a “common language” regardless of the communication technology used.

Therefore, the agency's proposal includes a common specification for basic safety message (BSM) content regardless of the potential communication technology. The proposal also provides potential performance-based approaches for two security functions in an effort to obtain reaction and comment from industry and the public.

Following is a more comprehensive discussion of the proposal and potential alternatives for different aspects of V2V security: Communication Technology. Proposal: NHTSA proposes to mandate DSRC technology—A DSRC unit in a vehicle sends out and receives “basic safety messages” (BSMs). DSRC communications within the 5.850 to 5.925 MHz band are governed by FCC, 1, 2 and 95 for onboard equipment and part 90 for road side units. In reference to the OSI model, the physical and data link layers (layers 1and 2) are addressed primarily by IEEE 802.11p as well as P1609.4; network, transport, and session layers (3,4 and 5) are addressed primarily by P1609.3; security communications are addressed by P1609.2; and additional session and prioritization related protocols are addressed by P1609.12. This mandate could also be satisfied using non-DSRC technologies that meet certain performance and interoperability standards. Message Format and Information. NHTSA proposes to standardize the content, initialization time, and transmission characteristics of the Basic Safety Message (BSM) regardless of the V2V communication technology potentially used.

The agency's proposed content requirements for BSMs are largely consistent with voluntary consensus standards SAE 2735 and SAE 2945 which contains data elements such as speed, heading, trajectory, and other information, although NHTSA purposely does not require some elements to alleviate potential privacy concerns. Standardizing the message will facilitate V2V devices “speaking the same language,” to ensure interoperability. Vehicles will not be able to “understand” the basic safety message content hindering the ability to inform drivers of potential crashes. Message Authentication.

Public Key Infrastructure Proposal: NHTSA proposes V2V devices sign and verify their basic safety messages using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) digital signature algorithm in accordance with performance requirements and test procedures for BSM transmission and the signing of BSMs. The agency believes this will establish a level of confidence in the messages exchanged between vehicles and ensure that basic safety message information is being received from devices that have been certified to operate properly, are enrolled in the security network, and are in good working condition.

It is also important that safety applications be able to distinguish these from messages originated by “bad actors,” or defective devices, as well as from messages that have been modified or changed while in transit. Alternative Approach—Performance-based Only: This first alternative for message authentication is less prescriptive and defines a performance-based approach but not a specific architecture or technical requirement for message authentication. This performance only approach simply states that a receiver of a BSM message must be able to validate the contents of a message such that it can reasonably confirm that the message originated from a single valid V2V device, and the message was not altered during transmission.

The agency seeks comment on this potential alternative. Alternative Approach—No Message Authentication: This second alternative stays silent on a specific message authentication requirement. BSM messages would still be validated with a checksum, or other integrity check, and be passed through a misbehavior detection system to attempt to filter malicious or misconfigured messages. Implementers would be free to include message authentication as an optional function. The agency seeks comment on this potential alternative.

Misbehavior Detection and Reporting. Primary Misbehavior Detection and Reporting Proposal: NHTSA proposes to mandate requirements that would establish procedures for communicating with a Security Credential Management System to report misbehavior; and learn of misbehavior by other participants. This includes detection methods for a device hardware and software to ensure that the device has not been altered or tampered with from intended behavior. This approach enhances the ability of V2V devices to identify and block messages from other misbehaving or malfunctioning V2V devices.

Misbehavior Detection Alternative Approach: An alternative for misbehavior detection imposes no requirement to report misbehavior or implement device blocking based to an authority. However, implementers would need to identify methods that check a devices' functionality, including hardware and software, to ensure that the device has not been altered or tampered with from intended behavior.

Implementers would be free to include misbehavior detection and reporting and as optional functions. Kof maximum impact 2 para pc download. The agency seeks comment on this alternative.

Hardware Security NHTSA proposes that V2V equipment be “hardened” against intrusion (FIPS-140 Level 3) by entities attempting to steal its security credentials. Effective Date The agency is proposing that the effective date for manufacturers to begin implementing these new requirements would be two model years after the final rule is adopted, with a three year phase-in period to accommodate vehicle manufacturers' product cycles. Assuming a final rule is issued in 2019, this would mean that the phase-in period would begin in 2021, and all vehicles subject to that final rule would be required to comply in 2023. Safety Applications The agency is not proposing to require specific V2V safety applications at this time.

We believe the V2V communications we are proposing will create the standardized information environment that will, in turn, allow innovation and market competition to develop improved safety and other applications. Additionally, at this time, the agency believes that more research is likely needed in order to create regulations for safety applications. In support of this, we are seeking comment on information that could inform a future decision to mandate any specific safety applications. Authority Under the Vehicle Safety Act, et seq., the agency has the legal authority to require new vehicles to be equipped with V2V technology and to use it, as discussed in Section VI below. NHTSA has broad statutory authority to regulate motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment, and to establish FMVSSs to address vehicle safety needs. Start Printed Page 3858 Privacy and Security V2V systems would be required to be designed from the outset to minimize risks to consumer privacy. The NPRM proposes to exclude from V2V transmitting information that directly identifies a specific vehicle or individual regularly associated with a vehicle, such as owner's or driver's name, address, or vehicle identification numbers, as well as data “reasonably linkable” to an individual.

Additionally, the proposal contains specific privacy and security requirements with which manufacturers would be required to comply. The Draft Privacy Impact Assessment that accompanies this proposal contains detailed information on the potential privacy risks posed by the V2V communications system, as well as the controls designed into that system to minimize risks to consumer privacy. Estimated Costs and Benefits In this NPRM, the agency proposes that all light vehicles be equipped with technology that allows for V2V communications, but has decided not to propose to mandate any specific safety applications at this time, instead allowing them to be developed and adopted as determined by the market. This market-based approach to application development and deployment makes estimating the potential costs and benefits of V2V quite difficult, because the V2V communication technology being mandated by the agency would improve safety only indirectly, by facilitating the deployment of previously developed OEM safety application. However, the agency is confident that these technologies will be developed and deployed once V2V communications are mandated and interoperable. Considerable research has already been done on various different potential applications, and the agency believes that functioning systems are likely to become available within a few years if their manufacturers can be confident that V2V will be mandated and interoperable.

In order to provide estimates of the rule's costs and benefits, the agency has considered a scenario where two V2V-enabled safety applications, IMA and LTA, are voluntarily adopted on hypothetical schedules similar to those observed in the actual deployment of other advanced communications technologies. The agency believes that IMA and LTA will reduce the frequency of crashes that cannot be avoided by vehicle-resident systems, and will thus generate significant safety benefits that would not be realized in the absence of universal V2V communications capabilities.

In addition, the marginal costs of including the IMA and LTA applications are extremely low once the V2V system is in place, which the agency believes will speed their adoption. The agency has not quantified any benefits attributable to the wide range of other potential uses of V2V, although we believe that such uses are likely to be numerous. Recognizing its experience with other technologies, the agency believes that focusing on two of the many potential uses of V2V technology that are inexpensive to implement provides a reasonable approach to estimating potential benefits of the proposed rule, and is likely to understate the breadth of potential benefits of V2V. We estimate that the total annual costs to comply with this proposed mandate in the 30th year after it takes effect would range from $2.2 billion to $5.0 billion, corresponding to a cost per new vehicle of roughly $135-$300. This estimate includes costs for equipment installed on vehicles as well as the annualized equivalent value of initial investments necessary to establish the overarching security manager and the communications system, among other things, but, due to uncertainty, does not include opportunity costs associated with spectrum, which will be included in the final cost benefit analysis.

The primary source of the wide range between the lower and upper cost estimates is based our assumption that manufacturers could comply with the rule using either one or two DSRC radios. As discussed above, our benefit calculation examines a case where manufacturers would voluntarily include the IMA and LTA applications on a schedule that reflects adoption rates the agency has observed for other advanced, vehicle-resident safety technologies.

Together, these applications could potentially prevent 424,901-594,569 crashes, and save 955-1,321 lives when fully deployed throughout the light-duty vehicle fleet. Converting these and the accompanying reductions in injuries and property damage to monetary values, we estimate that in 2051 the proposed rule could reduce the costs resulting from motor vehicle crashes by $53 to $71 billion (expressed in today's dollars). The agency conducted two accompanying analyses to identify meaningful milestones in the future growth of benefits resulting from this proposed rule.

These analyses highlight the effect that the passage of time has on the accumulated benefits from this proposed rule. Benefits in the first several calendar years after it takes effect will be quite low, because only a limited number of vehicles on the road will be equipped with V2V, but growth in these benefits will accelerate as time goes on. First, NHTSA used a “breakeven” analysis to identify the calendar year during which the cumulative economic value of safety benefits from the use of V2V communications first exceeds the cumulative costs to vehicle manufacturers and buyers for providing V2V capability. The breakeven analysis indicated that this important threshold would be reached between 2029 and 2032, depending primarily on the effectiveness of the application technologies. Next, NHTSA projected future growth in the proposed rule's benefits and costs over successive model years after it would take effect. This analysis identified the first model year for which the safety benefits from requiring vehicles to be equipped with V2V communications over their lifetime in the fleet would outweigh the higher initial costs for manufacturing them. It showed that this would occur in model year 2024 to 2026 if the proposed rule first took effect in model year 2021.

This occurs sooner than the breakeven year, because focusing only on costs and benefits over the lifetimes of individual model years avoids including the burden of costs for installing V2V communications on vehicles produced during earlier model years. Start Printed Page 3859. Table I-1—Costs. and Benefits in Year 30 of Deployment 2051 Total annual costs Per vehicle costs Crashes prevented and lives saved Monetary benefits (billions) $2.2 billion-$5.0 billion $135-$301 Crashes: 424,901-594,569 Lives: 955-1,321 $53-$71. Note: Does not include spectrum opportunity costs, which will be included in the analysis of the final rule. In order to account for the inherent uncertainty in the assumptions underlying this cost-benefit analysis, the agency also conducted extensive uncertainty analysis to illustrate the variation in the rule's benefits and costs associated with different assumptions about the future number of accidents that could be prevented, the assumed adoption rates and estimated effectiveness of the two safety applications, and our assumptions about the costs of providing V2V communications capability. Aside from opportunity costs, this analysis showed that the proposed rule would reach its breakeven year between 2030 and 2032 with 90 percent certainty, with even the most conservative scenario showing that the breakeven year would be five to six years later than the previously estimated years (2029-2032).

Considering these same sources of uncertainty in the cost-effectiveness and net benefits analyses showed that the proposed rule would become cost-effective and would accrue positive net benefits between MY 2024 and MY 2027 with 90 percent certainty. This indicates that it is very likely to become cost-effectiveness at most one MY later than estimated in the primary analysis, and that even under the most conservative scenario, this would occur two to three model years later than the initial estimate of 2024-2026. Regulatory Alternatives The agency considered two regulatory alternatives to today's proposal. Table II—1 37 Pre-Crash Scenario Typology 1. Vehicle Failure. Control Loss with Prior Vehicle Action.

Control Loss without Prior Vehicle Action. Running Red Light. Running Stop Sign. Road Edge Departure with Prior Vehicle Maneuver.

Road Edge Departure without Prior Vehicle Maneuver. Road Edge Departure While Backing Up. Animal Crash with Prior Vehicle Maneuver. Animal Crash without Prior Vehicle Maneuver. Pedestrian Crash with Prior Vehicle Maneuver. Pedestrian Crash without Prior Vehicle Maneuver. Pedalcyclist Crash with Prior Vehicle Maneuver.

Pedalcyclist Crash without Prior Vehicle Maneuver. Backing Up into Another Vehicle. Vehicle(s) Turning—Same Direction. Vehicle(s) Parking—Same Direction. Vehicle(s) Changing Lanes—Same Direction. Vehicle(s) Drifting—Same Direction.

Vehicle(s) Making a Maneuver—Opposite Direction. Vehicle(s) Not Making a Maneuver—Opposite Direction.

Following Vehicle Making a Maneuver. Lead Vehicle Accelerating.

Lead Vehicle Moving at Lower Constant Speed. Lead Vehicle Decelerating. Lead Vehicle Stopped. Left Turn Across Path from Opposite Directions at Signalized Junctions.

Vehicle Turning Right at Signalized Junctions. Left Turn Across Path from Opposite Directions at Non-Signalized Junctions. Straight Crossing Paths at Non-Signalized Junctions. Start Printed Page 3862 31. Vehicle(s) Turning at Non-Signalized Junctions. Evasive Action with Prior Vehicle Maneuver.

Evasive Action without Prior Vehicle Maneuver. Non-Collision Incident. Object Crash with Prior Vehicle Maneuver. Object Crash without Prior Vehicle Maneuver.

The 10 priority pre-crash scenarios listed in Table II-2 can be addressed by the corresponding V2V-based safety applications. Table II-2—Pre-Crash Scenario/Safety Application Association Pre-crash scenarios Pre-crash groups Associated safety application Lead Vehicle Stopped Rear-end Forward Collision Warning.

Lead Vehicle Moving Rear-end Forward Collision Warning. Lead Vehicle Decelerating Rear-end Forward Collision Waring/Emergency Electronic Brake Light. Straight Crossing Path @ Non Signal Junction Crossing Intersection Movement Assist. Left-Turn Across Path/Opposite Direction Left Turn @ crossing Left Turn Assist. Opposite Direction/No Maneuver Opposite Direction Do Not Pass Warning. Opposite Direction/Maneuver Opposite Direction Do Not Pass Warning.

Change Lanes/Same Direction Lane Change Blind Spot/Lane Change Warning. Turning/Same Direction Lane Change Blind Spot/Lane Change Warning. Drifting/Same Direction Lane Change Blind Spot/Lane Change Warning. The six applications listed in Table II-2 were developed and tested in the Connected Vehicle Safety Pilot Model Deployment. These safety warning applications were (1) Forward Collision Warning (FCW), (2) Emergency Brake Start Printed Page 3863Light (EEBL), (3) Intersection Move Assist (IMA), (4) Left Turn Assist (LTA), (5) Do Not Pass Warning (DNPW), and (6) Blind Spot/Lane Change Warning (BS/LCW). A description of each safety application and relationship to the pre-crash scenarios is provided below. (1) Forward Collision Warning (FCW): Warns drivers of stopped, slowing, or slower vehicles ahead.

FCW addresses rear-end crashes that are separated into three key scenarios based on the movement of lead vehicles: Lead-vehicle stopped (LVS), lead-vehicle moving at slower constant speed (LVM), and lead-vehicle decelerating (LVD). (2) Emergency Electronic Brake Light (EEBL): Warns drivers of heavy braking ahead in the traffic queue. EEBL would enable vehicles to broadcast its emergency brake and allow the surrounding vehicles' applications to determine the relevance of the emergency brake event and alert the drivers. EEBL is expected to be particularly useful when the driver's visibility is limited or obstructed. (3) Intersection Movement Assist (IMA): Warns drivers of vehicles approaching from a lateral direction at an intersection. IMA is designed to avoid intersection crossing crashes, the most severe crashes based on the fatality counts.

Intersection crashes include intersection, intersection-related, driveway/alley, and driveway access related crashes. IMA crashes are categorized into two major scenarios: Turn-into path into same direction or opposite direction and straight crossing paths. IMA could potentially address five of the pre-crash scenarios identified in Table II-2. (4) Left Turn Assist (LTA): Warns drivers to the presence of oncoming, opposite-direction traffic when attempting a left turn. LTA addresses crashes where one involved vehicle was making a left turn at the intersection and the other vehicle was traveling straight from the opposite direction. (5) Do Not Pass Warning (DNPW): Warns a driver of an oncoming, opposite-direction vehicle when attempting to pass a slower vehicle on an undivided two-lane roadway.

DNPW would assist drives to avoid opposite-direction crashes that result from passing maneuvers. These crashes include head-on, forward impact, and angle sideswipe crashes. (6) Blind Spot/Lane Change Warning (BS/LCW): Alerts drivers to the presence of vehicles approaching or in their blind spot in the adjacent lane. BS/LCW addresses crashes where a vehicle made a lane changing/merging maneuver prior to the crashes. The final table, Table II-3, merges the estimated target crash population for LV2LV crashes detailed in Table II-2 with the separate analysis that provided the breakdown of V2V pre-crash scenarios and relationships to prototype V2V safety applications. The 3.4 million LV2LV are distributed among the pre-crash scenarios that are associated with V2V safety applications and the economic and comprehensive costs.

More specifically, Table II-3 provides a breakdown of crashes associated with FCW, IMA, LTA, and LCW scenarios that are used later when discussing potential benefits in Section VII. Crash scenarios associated with DNPW and EEBL are grouped with all remaining crashes under the “other” category due to the fact they are not used when discussing benefits. The agency grouped these two potential applications into the “other” category because of EEBL's advisory nature that cannot be directly attributed to avoiding a specific crash and the agency's current understanding of DNPW indicates it only addresses a limited amount of crashes per a specific situation and where there are three equipped vehicles present, limiting the amount of information available to develop comprehensive effectiveness estimates.

Overall the agency estimates that, together, these four potential safety applications that could be enabled by this proposal could potentially address nearly 89 percent of LV2LV crashes and 85 percent of their associated economic costs. Table II-4—DSRC Performance Requirements and Compliance Testing Research NPRM RELEVANT Readiness report research need Description Research projects initiated to address Description Completion date Standards Need V-1 SAE Standards Maturity Currently Standards are being developed by outside standards organizations Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership V2V Interoperability and V2V System Engineering Projects Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership providing results of DSRC device performance requirements to SAE standards development committee for SAE J2735 and J2945 April 2016. Research Need V-2 Impact of Software Implementation on DSRC Device Performance V-2 V2V device software updates may be required over its lifecycle. Table II-5—System, Security, and Acceptance Research NPRM RELEVANT Readiness report research need Description Research projects initiated to address Description Completion date Policy Need IV-1 Road Side Equipment Authority NHTSA will evaluate the need for DOT to regulate aspects of RSE operation and assess its authority for doing so Authority evaluation conducted for NPRM Issuance of NPRM. Start Printed Page 3871 Policy Need IV-2 V2V Device Software Updates V2V device software updates may be required over its lifecycle. NHTSA will need to determine how to ensure necessary V2V device software updates are seamless for consumers and confirmed Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership V2V System Engineering project and Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership Security Credential Management System Proof of Concept project The System Engineering project will investigate software update requirements from the vehicle perspective as the Security Credential Management Systems project investigates software update from the security system perspective. Both projects will identify requirements that will facilitate the software update of V2V devices Completion Date for Requirements—Sept 2015.

Research Need V-1 Spectrum Sharing Interference Evaluate the impact of unlicensed U-NII devices on the transmission and reception of safety critical warnings in a shared spectrum environment Testing spectrum sharing feasibility A test plan for testing unlicensed devices that would share the band with licensed DSRC devices has been developed. The testing will evaluate the feasibility of sharing spectrum with unlicensed devices The evaluation of spectrum sharing interference is pending the conduct of tests with representative U-NII-4 devices that operate in the 5.9 GHz (DSRC) frequency band.Testing could be completed within 12 months of receipt of prototype devices. Research Need VII-1 Consumer Acceptance Supplement the driver acceptance analysis completed per the Driver Clinics and Safety Pilot Model Deployment with further research that includes a focused assessment of privacy in relation to V2V technology V2V Crash Avoidance Safety Technology Public Acceptance Review This review needs to extend the current evaluation of driver acceptance to a broader public acceptance context and evaluate how public acceptance may impact and or influence the design, performance, operation, and implementation of this technology September 2015.